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FrOfi Cross-Cultural Psychology to 
Cultural Psychology I 
Lutz H. Eckensberger 
Universitaet des Saarlandes 
Introduction 
I can weIl imagine that from the outside contempo-
rary psychology looks like a consolidated science: There 
exists a tremendous network of Psychological Institutes in 
Universities and Academies in almost every nation around 
the glohe; numerous national and international associa-
tions and journals were founded in the fIrst half of this 
century, and their numher is still increasing; and last but 
not least, psychology has a great influence on practical 
decisions in medicine, education, industry and even inter-
national affairs. All this is certainly true. And yet, it is also 
true that psychology from the very beginning has heen 
struggling for its identity as a human science. Although 
psychology may seem to have successfuIly come of age, 
it is still an open quest ion whether or not it can be further 
developed according to the principles of natural science, 
or whether it should have some unique features. Human 
beings, the way they think, feel and act, cannot easily be 
explained by "naturallaws" alone; "cultural mies" have 
also to be taken into consideration. But these mIes are 
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genuinely of another ontological status ~ natural laws 
because they are themselves human creations, and hence 
are not binding because human beings can change them. 
1bis tension between natural laws and cultural rules 
as explanatory frameworks for human activities is evident 
in Wundt's first programmatic ideas (cf. Graumann, 1980); 
it is the basis ofthe farnous "crisis ofPsychology," which 
was, interestingly enough, diagnosed in the very same 
year, 1927, by Karl Buhler and Lev Vygotsky; it prompted 
"critical reflections on psychology" in the seventies 
(Schultz, 1970), and it can readily be seen in the most 
recent efforts to develop a variety of "new Psychologies" 
like Historical Psychology, Dialectical Psychology, Cul-
tural Psychology and Indigenous Psychology to mention 
just a few (see also Krewer, this issue). 
I am therefore convinced that in the long run what 
psychology really has to deal with is exactly the tension 
between biological laws and cultural rules - how they 
regulate each other by setting boundaries or by facilitating 
speciflc conditions for the developing organisms and how 
they interrelate in emergent developmental processes in 
terms of history, phylogeny, ontogeny as weIl as micro-
processes (actualgenesis) of a single act (cf. Vogel & 
Eckensberger, 1988). 
It! the present article I will restrict my argument only 
to the "cultural side" of this problem. Although lamaware 
of the inadequacy of this decision (it is genuinely undia-
lectical), I feel justified in restricting myself in this way, 
because it is more often culture which is neglected in 
modern psychology than the biological basis for human 
activities. It should be kept in mind, however, that the 
following argument should be taken only as the ftrst step 
in a much longer theoretical discourse. 
In developing my argument, I will choose the cross-
cultural perspective. I have argued for ten years (Eck-
ensberger, 1979) that this perspective is particularly fruit-
ful and challenging since cross-cultural psychologists can 
detect certain limitations and/or deftciencies in methods 
and theories of mainstream psychology much more easily 
than their colleagues. Cross-cultural psychologists are 
compelled from the outset to take a hard, criticallook at 
the scientific routines and frameworks they use. Cross-
cultural experience makes them vividly aware of the 
limitations of pure experimental strategies, sampling tech-
niques, as weIl as of the dangers and pitfalls of comparing 
data gleaned by forrnally identical methods. However, 
important in the present discussion is the need to consider 
the cultural context of data collection and interpretation; 
and hence the importance of specifying the culture con-
cept itself. Knowledge of cultural roles for the reconstruc-
tion of behavior is an essential part of this subbranch of 
Psychology. 
In the present paper, I will not present a further 
description or enumeration of methodological and/or 
empirie al results that cross-cultural psychology may 
contribute to mainstream psychology. Instead, I will 
expIicitly take a normative stance. I will argue that if some 
trends in cross-cultural research and theorizing are taken 
seriously, then cross-cultural psychology as weIl as main-
stream psychology, will move towards what one might 
call "cultural psychology," Le., a psychology which ex-
plicitly contains "culture" as a feature unique to human 
beings. 
Some Trends in Cross-Cultural PsydlOlogy Which 
Argue for a Rethinking of Psychologica1 Methods 
and Theories 
Without claiming to cover the entire fteld of cross-
cultural psychology, I would Iike to point out three trends 
that I consider important. I shall focus primarilyon cog-
nitive development. 
Developmental Concepts as Key Ingredients in a 
Psychologica1 Theory 
There is increasing agreement in cross-cultural theo-
rizing that developmental processes are necessary ingre-
dients of any psychological theory because any interac-
tion between cultural conditions and individuals takes 
place over a long period of time. 1bis position is most 
expIicitly formulated by Heron and Kroeger (1981) who 
claim that "any serious and systematic attempt to study 
human behavior and experience must, in the very nature of 
things, be both developmental in depth and cross-cultural 
in breadth" (p. 1). 
Given the plausibiIity of this proposition it is aston-
ishlng that cross-cultural psychology is rarely develop-
mentally oriented; and few theories or concepts of devel-
opmental psychology have been expanded to include 
cross-cultural research (cf. Jahoda, 1986). The conclusion 
drawn by Heron and Kroeger (1981) is therefore a chal-
lenge for cross-cultural as weIl as for mainstream psychol-
ogy. The former expIicitly has to turn to developmental 
theories, and the latter has to expand its research to 
consider cross-cultural contexts. 
Fortunately, over the years cross-cultural psychology 
has become more developmentally oriented; a trend which 
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can be seen in such areas as motor development (Super & 
Harkness, 1981) and motivational development (Komadt, 
Eckensberger & Emminghaus, 1981). The developmental 
approach is most prominent, however, in the field of 
cognitive development, where theories proposed by Piaget, 
Kohlberg, and Witkin have become very influential. 
Owing to the influence of these theoretical frame-
works, two basic assumptions have become discernible 
and can be understood as alternative conceptions of devel-
opment. These assumptions replace those that dominated 
early cross-cultural psychology rooted in learning theory 
andlor ideas of cultural relativism. The first assumption is 
that development is a process actively produced by the 
subject. (Super & Harkness, 1981). The second is the 
claim that developmental stages or formal aspects of 
performance (Iike differentiation) are universaP 
ContextuaIism: Universalism and Constructivism 
Under Attack 
Although a general developmental orientation has 
been increasingly accepted in theorizing and in the re-
search, at least in the domain of cognition, the notions of
universalism and self-evolving constructivism have come
under heavy attack. The universality claim has been 
questioned simply because there exist considerable em-
pirical cross-cultural variations of most psychological 
processes. In addition, the assumption ofthe self-develop-
ing individual has been questioned because these vari-
ations turn out to be context specific; that is, they are at 
least co-determined by environmental conditions. 
There are several excellent recent reviews on this issue 
(Jahoda, 1986; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cog-
nition, 1983). For this reason, I will give here only abrief
summary of some of the important aspects of this discus-
sion. 
What are the so-called facts? 
- First, the data indicate that most context-specific vari-
abilities are not general cross-cultural variations in per-
formance, but tend to be rather fairly specific. 
- Second, and even more important, a deficiency in one 
domain (as viewed from a western standard) often goes 
hand in hand with a superiority in another. 
- Third, and most important, it is often possible to specify
an interaction between advantages/deficiencies in psy-





This means that a systematic correspondence between 
cultural and psychological conditions can be determined, 
a fact of utmost importance for all of psychology. 
- Fourth, context specific variability applies to almost 
every psychological process, domain or variable: Data 
exist on motor development, sleep/wake cycles, indican-
tors for attachment, perceptual skills, classification tasks, 
memory, and on motives like aggression and achieve-
ment. Hence, context specific variability applies to proc-
esses which traditionally have been interpreted as indica-
tors of neurological maturity of the brain (e.g., sleep/wake 
cycles) as weIl as to domains which, by contrast, have 
traditionally been assumed to be determined primarily by 
experience. 
As can be expected, the correct theoretical interpreta-
tion of these "facts" is highly disputed. In the field of 
cognitive development in particular, two divergent posi-
tions have been predominant: One interpreted the data in 
the constructivistic tradition with reference to some cen-
tral processes, and the other placed the locus of develop-
ment in cultural practices, i.e., in activities specifically 
demanded within a cultural context (LCHC, 1983). Re-
cently, however, these positions seem to have been merged 
to some extent (cf. Jahoda, 1986). Rather than give a 
historical review of this 20-year-old discussion here, I 
shall confme myself to addressing some of the theoretical 
dimensions arising out of this debate, focussing on both 
their general theoretical aspects as weIl as their more 
specific dimensions. 
General theoretical dimensions. Thirty two years 
ago, Boesch, one of the pioneers of cross-cultural psychol-
ogy in Gennany, pointed out that different cultures offer 
individuals different possibilities and constraints, thus 
enabling them to have specific experiences, which in turn 
can be interpreted as incitement or triggering conditions 
for an "active development." Furthennore, it was dear to 
Boesch that this process applies to the physical as weIl as 
to the social and symbolic environment (Boesch, 1958). 
These differences in availability of experiences in differ-
ent cultures certainly may account for some of the culture-
specific variance in cross-cultural data It has to be borne 
in rnind, however, that this first aspect does not challenge 
the idea of an active subject constructing his/her own 
development: It only leads to certain cultural or regional 
specifications of it. Therefore, recently, the tenn "Iocal 
constructivism" (Dasen, 1980; Harris & Heelas, 1979) has 
been used, which in my opinion, should instead be gener-
alized and given the label "contextualistic constructiv-
ism. " 
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A second, somewhat more convoluted argument was theory, have in fact played an important role in it. It is true 
recently developed by Glick (1985). He suggested that that Piaget is often accused of having interpreted develop-
cultures not only offer different possibiIities for experi- mental processes in a rather idealistic or solipsistic man-
ences but that these possibilities also imply rules or laws ner, in that he focussed upon the developmental processes 
which are "hidden" to varying degrees in different cul- of the isolated subject. But this is certainly not the whole 
tures. Especially in the case of technical (artificially story. Even in one of his early and well-known books on 
created) cultural elements, e.g., a computer, one would the development of intelligence, Piaget (1943, Chapter 6) 
probably need a "tutor" to discover its underlying struc- had explicitly underlined the necessity of action coordina-
ture or built-in rules. The same is not necessarily true for tions between subjects for the development of groupings. 
the comprehension of the larger part of natural processes; He even elaborated on the structural similarity between 
for example, comprehending that water conserves mass or communication and thinking (or reflection), since the 
weight when it is poured from one glass into another, no latter can be understood as communication with the self. 
matter what the individual design or form of the glass may Hence it becomes obvious that processes of cultural selec-
be. Glick's position emphasizes that this dimension is tion and canalisation serve not only to bring about the 
more difficult to cope with from a Piagetian constructiv- individual's own structures but also to promote some 
istic perspective, since basically a co-construction of an shared meaning of cultural elements amongst members of 
individual structure is called for. I will return to this issue the same culture. To a certain extent, therefore even 
soon. cognitive structures derived from interactions with physi-
cal objects can be perceived as being socially constructed. 
At the same time, Glick' s position draws attention to 
and elarifies the notion that most "constructions" or "co- Specific theoretical concepts or perspectives. The 
constructions" of cognitive structures during develop- kind and number of empirically defmed performance! 
ment are in fact "re-constructions" of knowledge, because context-interactions enumerated above also raise some 
most of them are already inherent in the culture one grows doubts about the validity or usefulness of some explana-
up in. Furthermore, it is also implied in Glick's argument tory concepts at the microlevel of developmental proc-
that cultural elements are initially produced by humans esses where the rather global concept of "constructivism" 
and not only reconstructed by them (as is the case with is broken down into specific mechanisms. Again the fol-
"natural" processes). Finally, from examples given and lowing arguments will be restricted to cognitive develop-
arguments set out by Boesch (1958), Glick (1985), ment. 
Goodnow & Cashmore (1985), Super & Harkness (1981), 
Valsiner (1987) and others, it can be learned that cultures The assumption of a highest stage. With reference 
not only offer different amounts and types of experiences to Piaget's theory, Davids (1983), Glick (1985) and Green-
for subjects but also that different domains of experience field (1976) were the first to propose a elear distinction 
are also differently evaluated in different cultures. They between the basic theoretical concepts underlying the 
may be positively valued (considered to be appropriate, general developmental theory and the stage theory itself. 
natural, good or useful, cf. Goodnow & Cashmore, 1985) They argued that the latter is much eloser to the operation-
or they may be negatively valued (considered to be inap- alization of structures, therefore much more content-
propriate, unnatural, bad or just useless). It is therefore laden, and therefore also much more culturally biased. If 
argued that in the first case, there will be a resulting this distinction is marle carefully, however, it becomes 
"selective pressure of the culture," a pressure which may evident that the general idea of a genetic epistemology 
be low, moderate or strong, and may therefore reach from leads neither to the specific choice of logical operations as 
support of, to demands for, behavior. In the latter case, being the highest stage of cognitive growth (Greenfield, 
culture will produce "canalizing constraints" which may 1976), nor to the acceptance of Kant's "categorical im-
vary from simple disincentives to prohibitions to taboos. perative" or of Rawl's "justice concept" as being of the 
highest stage in the domain of morality. Quite the con-
These last "dimensions" elearly come elose to the trary. The basic idea of a genetic epistemology only 
ideas proposed by Michael Cole and his associates at the assurnes that cognitive systems have to be analyzed via 
Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition because developmental processes because they are themselves de-
here the locus of development is seen primarily in the velopmentally constructed. 
culture and not in the individual. In fairness, however, it 
must be stressed that the LCHC group has pointed out that So this position would in fact only lead to a strategy 
co-operations, far from being excIuded from Piagetian that initially focuses on a search for structurally complex 
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(or most complex) notions of 10gica1 ~d ethica1 thinking 
in different cultures. A developmenta1 reconstruction of 
these structures would then be the next task (cf. Davids, 
1983). This approach would smooth out some of the 
difficulties encountered in, for example, scoring answers 
to moral dilemmas from different cultures. These difficul-
ties arose from the fact that certain answers in moral 
dilemma interviews were highly structured, but they ei-
ther referred to criterionjudgements in Kohlberg's manu-
als which dominate lower stages, or they did not match 
existing criterion judgements at all. Such difficulties have 
been reported for verbal material on higher stages of moral 
judgement from Tibetan monks, Israeli kibbutniks or 
Indian subjects. These populations referred to contents 
like collective happiness or nonviolence (Snarey, 1985), 
which are not centra1 parts of any western ethic, but which 
refIect principles central to ethical systems of the respec-
tive cultures. 
In the context of the present argument, these answers 
can be understood to represent the core of higher moral 
stages that are specific to the respective cultures. This does 
not mean, however, that their developmental paths cannot 
be refracted through universa1 structures. 
The assimilationlaccommodation equilibrium. 
One could argue, that Piaget's centra1 idea of an equilib-
rium between assimilation and acconunodation is a1so 
challenged by the various cultural sources of development 
(availability, selective pressure, canalizing constraints) 
mentioned above. However, the LCHC group (1983) 
argues convincingly that the~ "digestion analogy" implied 
in the process of equilibration can indeed be maintained in 
spite of these complications. They elaborate: "Just as 
parents prepare the food that children will consume, so, 
too, parents (and others in the child's environment) pre-
pare and constrain the type of intellectual experiences to 
which the child will be exposed" (p. 346). 
Reflective abstraction. Whereas the above example 
is focused more on the assimilation aspect of the assimi-
lation-acconunodation equilibrium, it is again Glick (1985), 
who draws attention to the principle of refIective abstrac-
tion, which is used by Piaget especially as an explanatory 
concept for the constructivistic part of cognitive develop-
ment, and which can be understood as a system that 
operates as "refIections upon actions." Glick (1985) 
underlines the ingenuity of this concept because it repre-
sents a non- innate, yet universa1 basis for the progression 
of knowledge. GIick criticizes it because it is "ftrmly fixed 
on the organism side" and is "fundamenta1ly acultural" (p. 
106). Therefore, he ca1ls for "multiple theories of the 
growth of mind" after having demonstrated that some 
constructions via cultural contexts are, in fact, "co-con-
structions" (see above). 
Optimization of development. Beyond these points 
of criticism in discussions about "cognition and culture," 
rises the idea of an "optimization of development." It is 
assumed that cognitive confIicts are especially productive 
for a subject, if they are produced by items of information 
slightly higher than the developmental stage of that sub-
ject. This idea is sometimes referred to as the "n+ I" -con-
dition," or as "dosed discrepancies" and it is formulated in 
the somewhat more advanced concept of the "zone of 
proxima1 development, ZPD" (LCHC, 1983; Vygotsky, 
1978), which is defined as "the distance between the 
actua1 developmental level of an individual, as deter-
mined by independent problem solving, and the level of 
potential development, as determined through problem 
solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with 
more capable peers (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86, quoted after 
Valsiner, 1987, 107). 
A very similar concept which is, however, formulated 
more radically, can be seen in what Fuerestein (1989) ca1ls 
"mediated learning." Iike the "zone of proxima1 develop-
ment" this concept also refers to processes which repre-
sent co- constructions of a child and a "tutor." Fuerestein, 
however, even go es as far as to claim that this type of 
learning is constitutive for humans and forms the essence 
of culture. 
IndividuaIismICollectivism 
A third trend in modem cross-cultural psychology 
involves the dichotomy between individualism and col-
lectivism. There are various indicators from cross-cultural 
research that challenge the individualistic orientation of 
the western "model of man," and are in direct contrast to 
the collectivistic orientation of other cultures. However, 
neither the content, dimensionality, or the logical status, 
nor the evaluative implications of the concept of collec-
tiveness have been agreed upon (Kagitcibasi, 1987). In the 
present context it is especially striking that the dichotomy 
is primarily defmed within a non-developmental social-
psychological context. Apart from these weak points, 
which may be considered as quite natural in an emerging 
field, the topic itself is highly relevant today. In my 
opinion, however, it is not so much the dichotomy itself 
which is important here but the fact that the individualis-
tic orientation of western mainstream psychology is, in 
itself, a quite tacit and unrefIected assumption, rather than 
an explicitly formulated parameter in western psychologi-
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cal theories. It is true that considerable effort is made in 
research to control beliefs, self concepts and some related 
constructs (cf. Harter, 1983). It is also true that autonomy 
is accepted in most developmental theories of the self as 
the feature of a mature stage, but the basic potential 
capacity of human self-reflexivity is, in fact, rarely an 
explicit part of psychologica1 theories (cf. Eckensberger, 
1979). Once again, it is cross-cultural evidence which has 
initiated reflections on assumptions made by our western 
theories. 
A CaIl rar a Cultural Psychology 
A conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing 
discussion is that both future theorizing and research 
(even in cross-cultural psychology) do not necessarily 
have to focus upon comparisons between measurements 
collected in different cultural groups, but rather upon the 
cultural context of psychological dimensions or qualities. 
1bis conclusion is a clear contradiction of the per-
spective of some reputable colleagues in the cross-cultural 
field such as Poortinga and bis associates. On the contrary 
their intention is to decontextualize psychological vari-
ables to revea1 underlying universal human characteristics 
by "peeling the onion called culture" layer after layer until 
the culture concept itself has vanished (Poortinga, van de 
Vijver, Joe & van de Koppel, 1987). Others, however, 
have drawn a sirnilar conclusion to the one advanced in 
this paper. In 1980, Price-Williams argued in line with my 
own point of view and that of my colleagues that "the 
radica1 thesis is that any psychologica1 variable cannot be 
taken apart from its association with the cultural medium 
in which it is embedded" (p. 81). FIrst, he proposed the use 
of the narne "cultural psychology" instead of cross-cul-
tural psychology, and second, he argued "that the funda-
mental unit for a cultural psychology has to be organism-
environment interactions" (p. 84). 
Although I clearly agree with the underlying idea, I 
would prefer to defme the "fundamental units" of a cul-
tural psychology as "individual culture-interactions." I 
assert this for the sake of systematizing the approach as 
well as for bistorica1 reasons. On the one band, in the past 
decades the claim of "organism-environment-interactions" 
has been successfully substantiated outside cross-cultural 
cirdes (as in the "ecologica1 psychology" and "environ-
mental psychology movements" of the sixties and seven-
ties). On the other band, the term "culture" is much more 
tied to the species "homo sapiens" than the term "environ-
ment" 
Having said so much and so little at the same time, I 
should like to move towards specifying the term "cultural 
psychology" by enumerating at least the most basic ques-
tions of concem which this discipline should try to answer. 
Obviously, I will do so by drawing some implications 
from the foregoing discussion. It goes without saying that 
these conclusions can be formulated only very broadly in 
the present context, which also means that they may look 
a bit hybrid. 
First, broadly speaking, cultural psychology should 
aim at an integration of the cultural and the individual 
level. Both cultural and individual changes should not 
only be interrelated (descriptively or systematica1ly), but 
should be constructed within the same theoretical frame-
work. 
Second, cultural psychology should aim at an integra-
tion of individual and collective (cultural) meaning sys-
tems, as weIl as their development and interrelationsbip. 
Not the least important task of any such theory should be 
to determine the limits of agency in the sense of potential 
self -reflexivi ty. 
1bird, cultural psychology should try to bridge the 
gap between objectivism and subjectivism. The meaning 
of the context for individuals is obviously of central 
irnportance in reconstructing the way they think, feel, and 
act. Objective cultural and historica1 conditions, no less 
than the subjective meaning of these conditions for indi-
viduals have to be incorporated in any adequate theory of 
"cultural psychology." 
A Typology of Action-Fields: An Opening for an 
Adequate Theory of Cultural Psychology? 
There are many reasons why a "cultural psychology" 
is not unanimously agreed upon in the cross-cultural 
scientific community. There are, of course, methodologi-
ca1 objectionsl based on the fear of a lowering of standards 
and a drop in prestige, but there is also doubt as to whether 
a theory of the required integrative power is even possible. 
In any event, there is a lack of consensus-regarding the 
defmition of "individual-culture-interactions." 
Although a detailed discussion of all aspects of a 
theory suited for a cultural psychology is clearly beyond 
the scope of this paper, some comments may be helpful 10 
delineate the theoretica1 framework my colleagues and I 
are trying to develop. 
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To prevent any misunderstanding; it must be empha- posed beginning with some main dimensions of culture to 
sized ftrst that a contextualistic orientation does not rule theorize about their "psychological relevance" - or their 
out comparisons. Price-Williams (1980) agrees in saying, irnplications for the ontogeny of psychological processes. 
"Contexts are not necessarily unique, they can be com- He distinguished forty cultural variables or groups of 
pared" (p. 82). And, in fact, Michael Cole's work in the variables, wbich are compatible with later taxonomie 
Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition is an excel- approach es of concrete cultural groups (Textor, 1967) as 
lent example of this kind of comparison-hardly surpris- weIl as with theoretical discussions of the culture concept 
ing as bis approach was originally called "Experimental in anthropology (cf. Renner, 1980; Geertz, 1965). Table 1 
Anthropology. " Unfortunately, however, there are also gives a summary of Boesch's (1958) cultural and psycho-
objections to this position, such as the practical doubts logical aspects, some of which have been used in cross-
Jahoda (1980) formulated some years ago, when he wrote cultural research while others have not. They all demon-
that, "This approach appears to require extremely exhaus- strate, however, that at least some of the implications of 
tive, and in practice, aImost endless explorations of quite the global culture dimensions are of the utrnost attractive-
different pieces of behavior with no guarantee of a deci- ness for psychological research and theory, in general, and 
sive outcome" (p. 126). On the other hand, Jahoda also would in fact help to determine, clarify, and systematize 
points toward a solution when he adds, "this might not be the speciftc "cultural contents" that a psychological the-
necessary if there were a workable 'theory of situations' at ory should make use of (see Table 1, next page). 
our disposal ( ... ) what is lacking in tl)e context speciftc 
approach are global theoretical constructs relating to AIthough these earlier writings still suggest that cul-
cognitive processes of the kind Piaget provides, and which tural dimensions should logically be treated as independ-
save the researcher from becoming submerged in a mass ent variables, a second orientation, which can be gleaned 
of unmanageable material" (1980, p. 126). from Boesch's general approach (especially in later pub-
lications, Boesch, 1976; 1980; 1983; 1987) is that one 
Our own theoretical and empirical efforts are aimed should use "actions in cultural contexts" as the unit of 
precisely at the development of such "global theoretical analysis. This decision implies that neither a taxonomy of 
constructs." In fact, this effort has very much in common subjects, nor one of situations, is intended. Instead, we are 
with the view advanced by Michael Cole and bis group. working on a "typology" of actions in action contexts. 
However, our approach is rooted in different origins. Interestingly enough, the LCHC group's reaction to 
While Cole and bis associates are heavily influenced by Jahoda's (1980) critique, mentioned above, implies a 
Soviet psychology, especially by the work of Vygotsky, sirnilar solution, in that they propose a taxonomy of 
Luria and Leontiev, our work is primarily influenced by situations based upon "domains of activities" LCHC, 
Boesch, who over the last thirty years has argued in 1983, p. 299, and 245 ff.). Such a typology also folIo ws 
support of a theory wbich comprises a cultural perspec- from Piaget's basic theory as expounded by Davids 
tive, although it is still a genuinely psychological theory. (1983). Fmally, the indissolvable bond between context 
Boesch's own system is built upon (a) Piagetian con- and action is also underlined in present-day discussions of 
structivism, (b) Janet's dynamic theory, (c) Lewinian contextualism as a general epistemological orientation. 
fteld-theory, and d) depth-psychological symbolism (cf. To cite Rosnow & Georgoudid (1986) " ... an act or event 
Eckensberger, 1989).4 cannot be said to have an identity apart from the context 
that constitutes it; neither can a context be said to exist 
AIthough we differ from Boesch's approach in sev- independently of the act or event to which it refers" (p. 6). 
eral respects, and have proposed some systematizations 
which are beyond bis own intentions, we consider bis It is quite evident that it is impossible to expound or 
theoretical frarnework as a fertile ground for the unfolding elaborate an entire psychology" solelyon the basis of the 
of our own work. As will be seen, however, we also make theoretical orientation discussed here. However we will 
use of some distinetions proposed by Habermas (1981). summarize at least four of its main features (cf. also Figure 
1, see page 46). 
The ftrst basic orientation in our work is the idea that 
the concept of culture not only gives rise to some of the First, although actions are executed by subjects in real 
problems enumerated above in the context of cross-cul- life situations, we suggest that the action itself can be 
tural psychology, but that it also provides some solutions. understood as the dynamic interface between the individ-
As earlyas 1958, at a meeting of UNESCO experts on ual and the situational context. And as can be seen in 
cross-cultural research in child psychology, Boesch pro- Figure I, the action forms the overlap between intemal 
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Table 1. Cultural Variables and their Psychological Relevance (after BOESCH, 1958) 
Cultural Variables Psvchological Relevance 
a) Climate and Nature 
a- 1. Geographical situation Influence on physical conditions (health, 
metabolism, endocrine situation. etc.); 
2. Variations of temperature, humidity and 
atmospheric pressure 
effort and fatigue; 
3. Soll and possibilities of cultivation anxiety and security; 
4. Closed or open area (possibilities of 
transportation 
broadness or narrowness of experience 
and human contacts 
5. AnimaIs and vegetation religious and superstitious ideas, etc. 
b) Population 
b-1. Density of population Individual communication; 
2. Racial groups and mixture of races various degrees of privacy; 
3. Migrations of stability of population nationalism and racial prejudice, similarity 
or opposition of attitudes; 
4. l.anguages attitudes towards propriety; 
forms of thought, trends of communication 
(e.g. two language groups may a1ways use 
only one or both of their languages for 
communication). 
c) Society 
c- 1. Dwellings Farnily-size and farnily life; 
2. Size of communities participation in public life; 
3. Structure of communities attitudes of obedience or of individual initiative; 
4. Forms of community participation interests; 
5. Occupational characteristics possibilities of increasing personal economic status 
6. Economic characteristics 
d) Institutions 
d-1. School or other educational institutions Forms of initiation into social and occupational 
life; 
2. Church or other religious institutions religious constraints and ideas, formation of 
anxiety and feelings of security; 
3. Administration and govemment bodies political interests and activities; 
4. Societies, groups, clans interests in group and forms of group 
manifestations. 
e) Customs and habits 
e- 1. Rhythms of life Valuation of time; 
Time consciousness and value of time, 
individual life rhythms, social life rhythms 
rhythm of work; 
expectations connected with time 
attitude towards age; 
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Table 1. continued: 
Cultural Variables Psvchological Relevance 
2. Food and eating (kind of food, preparation, 
habits connected with eating, including 
social habits) 
Value of enjoyment, of physical fitness, 
of social gathering; 
3. Verbal and non-verbal cornmunication 
(forrns of greeting, speaking, gestures 
spontaneity or formalism of social approach; 
4. Rituals for special occasions, like birth, 
initiation ceremonies, marriage 
occupational initiation, death, house 
building, war-fare. 
attitudes of submission and command; 
repression of emotional reactions; 
anxiety formation and anxiety prevention; 
5. Clothing and nakedness separation between age-groups; 
6. Health practices attitudes towards sex and love; 
7. Educational customs at horne and in the 
group 
f- 1. In connection with nature Superstitions, related to anxiety; 
2. In connection with human fate 
3. In connection with education ideas of destiny and attempts to act on destiny; 
4. In connection with religion (including 
any kind of supernatural belief. Herethe 
separation between theoretical or theological 
formulations and popular beliefs and attitudes 
is important; it is important, too, to look at 
religious models and their influence on non-
religious forrns of life, e.g. to consider the 
"existential example" of Christ or of Buddha 
for instance detached from their religious 
teaching) 
formation of guilt, ideas of punishment 
and purification, spirtual ideals; 
value formation and interiorisation, 
etc. 
g) Crisis 
g-1. Types of crisis occuring in the group 
(war, epidemies, revolutions, etc.) 
Security or insecurity of forms of life; 
2. Frequency of crisis social value of aggressive or of dominant 
behavior; 
3. Ways of dealing with crisis consciousness of crisis; 
4. Prophylaxis of crisis correspondence between ideals and reality; 
planning of social life. 
h) Material 
h- 1. Materials for use Values attached to tools and materials; 
2. Materials for protection 
3. Materials for embellishment forrns and levels of skilI; 
4. Materials for cults importance of industrial forrns of life. 
5. Tools for manufacturing and working 
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Figure 1. A framework of a "cultural psychology"-A summary of action-theory terms . 
and extemal "action fields." Hence We claim that thisunit oriented" actions, they are also markedly different 
of analysis allows both individual development (onto- with respect to specific properties. 
geny) and socio-historical changes to be incorporated 
within the same theoretical framework. Individuals struc- (b) On the second level, actions are action-oriented 
ture their own actions and are, in turn, transformed by and subject to regulations and reflections. Regula-
these actions (in the Piagetian sense), while objective tions are threefold: structural, affective or ergonomie; 
changes in the culture are likewise products of actions. and they primarily are used to reconstruct the actual 
Both individual and cultural processes are part of what can genesis (microprocess) of the single act. Instead, 
be called "primary structuration." . reflective processes are most important to reconstruct 
ontogeny, in the sense of reflected abstraction formu-
Second, in following Habermas (I 981) rather loosely, lated by Piaget. Some important types of re fleet ions 
we distinguish at least two basie types of actions: one are illustrated in Figure 2 (see next page). 
which is instrumental, in that it is effect-oriented and 
covers the material and physical world; and another which As can be seen in this figure, we first distinguish 
is oriented towards empathy and understanding and there- between two types of abstractions. We speak of a "re-
fore covers the social world. flective abstraction" if the actors own actions are 
reflected upon. We speak of "understanding abstrac-
Third, we propose to distinguish analytically be- tion," however, if actions of one or more other actors 
tween three levels of activity which apply equally to both are taken as the object of thought (cf. Eckensberger, 
types of actions, and which, in addition, relate psychologi- 1987). If we also add the distinction between instru-
cal concepts to cultural ones. To illustrate these levels, we mental and communieative actions, it becomes evi-
will make use of some of the cultural dimensions, summa- dent that in any communieative action reflective and 
rized in Table 1. It will be seen that the descriptive understanding processes are simultaneously present. 
taxonomie status of these aspects is to some extent trans- If we fmally complement these cases by taking Glick's 
formed in favor of a new significance within the terms of (I 985) discussion on co-actions into account, we then 
the theory. can even develop abstraction processes of "co-reflec-
tions" and "co-understanding," which are, however, 
(a) On the first level, actions are oriented towards "the intrinsieally communieative processes. It may be 
world," whieh is represented by natural conditions noteworthy to mention that we do not claim that any 
such as climate and nature (geographieal situation, reflection of "co-actions" by necessity has to be either 
temperature, humidity, kind of soil, openness of the abstraction by co-reflection or by co-understanding. 
terrain, animals, vegetation); by "phenomenal aspects So, while I agree that the notion of "co-constructions" 
of culture" (materials for use and proteetion, embel- is a more complicated matter than "pure" or "sponta-
lishment, artifacts); by other concrete individuals neous constructions," I do not think that the acknowl-
(relatives, peers, representatives of authority); by edgment of such processes destroys the idea of reflec-
aspects of population (density, ethnic groups, migra- tive abstraction in principle. We agree, however, that 
tion-stability, language); by societal characteristies reflective processes upon co-actions or co-operations 
(dwellings, size and structure of communities, forms should get more attention in future theory and re-
of participation, occupational characteristies); by search, and we hope that some of the distinctions we 
institutions (schools, education, church, administra- make may serve a heuristie function in this endeavor. 
tive bodies); by customs and habits (rhythms of life, 
food and eating; by types of communication, special Finally, we consider all types of reflections and 
rituals) and finally by the individual's own body regulations as being provoked by action barriers (prob-
(clothing and nakedness, health practiees) (cf. Table lems in the case of effect-oriented actions; contlicts in 
1). These types of action originate from personal the case of communication-oriented actions) as per-
concems (goal structures) and basic motivations and ceived by the subject or by crises as produced by the 
are accompanied by simple emotions (e.g. rage, joy, culture.5 
fear, cf. Campos, et al, 1983). From the cognitive point 
of view, they lead primarily to a figurative schemata Again, if one tries to link specific cultural aspects 
in the Piagetian sense. We assurne, however, that of Table 1 to the second level of actions, then it 
although these actions share some basie features, as in becomes evident that with regard to culture these 
the case of "effect-oriented" and "communication- secondary actions lead to those aspects of culture 


























S A -+ actiol\ -+ 0 I 









= Subjects A. .... E 
actionc = communication action 
























refl. and underst. 
! relection/undcrstanding 


















e SA ++ actionc ++ S;) 0A ++ actio~ ++ SB) 








o = actor 
= object of refection/understanding 
Figure 2. Types of reßectivelunderstanding abstraction 
48 The Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, January 1990, Volume 12, Number 1 
whlch are known as "ideational" (Renner, 1980), and 
whieh represent beliefs and normative frameworks. 
That is, they relate to knowledge and ruIe-systems 
whlch refer to nature as weIl as to culture itself (Hke 
laws, ethics, esthetics, science, technology). In regard 
to the subject, parallellogieal motivational and evalu-
ative frameworks are constructed and reconstructed. 
Here precisely is the (theoretically located) dynamic 
interface between individual and cultural rule-sys-
tems whlch Shweder points to (1980). 
(c) The third level of actions, finally, is agency-
oriented. Although I have some conceptual difficul-
ties with the concept of indigenous psychology as weIl 
as with earlier applications of individual constructs to 
groups (like the "conscience ofthe clan" or "ego ofthe 
group," cf. Parin, 1978) we do not want to exclude 
these concepts from our theoretic:al approach on a 
priori grounds. What is important, however, is the 
claim that there is an agency per se whlch acts and to 
whlch acts are related, whether the boundaries of the 
agency are restricted to a single individual or not. In 
any case, we assurne the existence of a potential 
agency-oriented reflection-process, whieh has two 
aspects: One directed towards the agency, whlch we 
call "self-reflexivity," and another oriented towards 
"culture," whlch we identify as "dramaturgie aspects" 
of action, a term we again borrow from Habermas 
(I 981) a1though we realize that he derives this concept 
within a somewhat different systematic framework. 
With regard to culture (see Table I), these third-order 
actions relate to roles and role~systems, whlle they lead to 
self-concepts or the not ion of identity in the individual. 
While a11 three levels are differentiated analytically, they 
are (or can be) simultaneously present in a single act. 
Fourth, we follow Boesch (I987) in accepting a 
further process, which we considerhighly fruitful a1-
though it is still formulated rather speculatively. This is 
called the process of "secondary structuration." Although 
it is as yet mainly conceived with reference only to the 
primary level of actions, and although the implications of 
these processes for socially oriented actions have not yet 
been elaborated in any great detail, secondary structura-
tions are conceptualized by Boesch (cf. 1987) on the basis 
of the notion that any action and any goal has two dimen-
sions or aspects. One, whlch is usually considered, is the 
instrumental aspect i.e., an action is canied out instrumen-
taly in order to reach a goal (e.g., taking a hammer to drive 
a naiI into the wall). There is, a second aspect in any action, 
whlch Boesch calls the subjective-functional aspect. Here 
the driving of the nail into the wall may have the meaning 
that one feels proud of being able to do so; one may also 
enjoy it, or it may relate to feelings of rage. In any case, the 
action of nailing acquires a meaning beyond its instrumen-
tal purpose, and whlch is not necessarily conscious. 
The distinction between the two aspects of secondary 
structurations leads to several very stimulating conse-
quences: Although these aspects can be distinguished 
anaIytically, they are always simultaneously present within 
the very same action. This is the reason why Boesch 
claims that actions are always polyvalent. He says "only 
in conjunction do both components constitute an action: 
without the one it would have no reality, without the other 
no meaning" (Boesch, 1987). 
The meaning derived from the subjective-functional 
aspect of actions has, however, two aspects: First, the 
subject realizes his or her potential to act in a certain way. 
This leads to the subjective "results" of what Boesch calls 
"subjective functionality." Second, the situation, or an 
object which is used in an action (the hammer for in-
stance), now represents this subjective meaning. In other 
words: It symbolizes the functional potentiality of the 
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Figure 3. Processes of primary and secondary 
structuration in Boesch's action theory 
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Ibis general idea is elaborated by Boesch in many di-
rections, which can only be briefly mentioned in the 
present context. Boesch distinguishes different kinds of 
symbolic representations and applies the idea of subjec-
tive-functional aspect of actions to higher order rule 
systems or regulatory systems of actions at the individual 
and cultural level. 
In the case of the individual level, he uses the term 
"fantasm" for private higher order regulatory systems, 
which can be rather basic or general. These symbolic 
representations are general ideas through which one tries 
to structure and lead one's life in relation to the world. 
Examples of these include private ideas of happiness, 
success, love, the "good life," of the person one wants to 
be, and the like. 
On the cultural level, Boesch identifies "myths" as 
collective rule-systems which, are "general, ideological 
guidelines of thought which regulate the specifications of 
social rules and provide systems of justification and con-
duct, as well as of explanations of events" (Boesch, 1987). 
Ibis last aspect, in particular, could pave the way to a 
theoreticaI interpretation of the existence of and the rela-
tionships between individual and collective meaning 
systems. 
There is a fmal important aspect to the theory of 
cultural psychology which we have not yet elaborated and 
can be only be named here. The logical status and structure 
of time: Time not only structures the single act (actual-
genesis) but also forms part of ontogeny and cultural 
change. Beyond this, time also acquires a specific contex-
tual meaning in terms of the biography of an individual 
and of the history of a culture (cf. Krewer & Eckensberger, 
1988). 
Last but not least, it is important to realize that time is 
handled differently by different individuals and within 
different cultures. Rhythms of daily activities of work or 
of the seasons of the year-anything that offers a frame-
work, or sets constraints, by means of customs and habits 
or through the individual's own body, also has a physicaI 
relevance for the structure of time for the individual (cf. 
Super & Harkness, 1985). These actions originate from 
personal concerns (goai structures) and basic motivations. 
They are accompanied by simple affectslemotions (e.g., 
rage, joy, fear) and they lead primarily to figurative 
schemata in the Piagetian sense. 
Closing Remar ks 
I hope that the foregoing discussion has adequately 
expressed my view that cross-cultural psychology pro-
vides a wealth of reasons for thoroughly reviewing the 
basic tenets of psychology; and that these very reasons, 
moreover, point the way to some of the solutions needed 
for the problems which have arisen in the discipline of 
psychology. This is so because the culture concept, de-
spite its lang and controversial history in human sciences, 
can nevertheless be used as a productive practical and 
theoretical guideline to determine specific individual-
environment relations in our terms of "actions in cultural 
contexts." 
Notes 
lThe following contribution is to a large extent based upon an 
invited paper read at the IACCP symposium, "The contributions 
of cross-cultural psychology to mainstream psychological the-
ory" (convened by Walter J. Lonner) at the XXIV International 
Congress of Psychology, Sydney, Australia, Sept. 2, 1988. I 
would like to thank Doris Fritzsche and Lucille Dunn for 
improving the style of an earlier version of this paper. 
lTo preclude any misunderstanding which might occur espe-
cially in the framework of the tension between biology and 
culture referred to in the introduction, it is important to realize 
that the universality claim in cognitive theories does not imply 
that the transformations of cognitive performances are based on 
genetic or maturational processes. lnstead, it rests upon the 
fundamental assumption that there is a universal potential of the 
growing individual to construe his/her own cognitive schemata. 
Vogel & Eckensberger (1988) propose therefore not only to 
distinguish homologies based upon genetics and traditions, but 
to introduce a third type which is based upon logical constraints 
(p. 605). 
3It is certainly true that basic changes in paradigms also imply 
methodological changes (cf. Eckensberger & Burgard, 1983). 
But a discussion of these changes is, not possible in the present 
context. 
4It may be interesting to note that the similarities in the approach 
of Cole's and of our own work can probably be traced back to the 
common origins of Boesch's and Vygotsky's ideas. Valsiner 
(1988) enumerates various "European roots" of Vygotsky's 
ideas which overlap remarkably with the "bilding bricks" of 
Boesch's theory (Piaget, Janet, Lewin). Valsiner (1988) even 
calls Vygotsky a "European thinker" (p. 123). 
SSome examples may be helpful of how we both identify and 
distinguish psychological processes within the two major action 
types. First, the designation of action barriers as problems or 
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conflicts implies that the subject interprets events and processes 
differentially. We propose (Eckensberger & Emminghaus, 1982) 
to speak of a problem, in those cases when a barrier is interpreted 
by the subject in terms of a material or causal process. This is the 
reason why these barriers can be removed only on the basis of the 
same (causal) principle. We speak of a barrier in terms of a 
conflict, however, in those cases when a barrier is interpreted by 
the subject as being produced intentionally by another agent 
(person or group). Consequently in thls case, intentional and not 
causal processes have to be taken into consideration if thls 
barrter is to be ·removed," Le., some type of conflict resolution 
has to be brought about Second, with reference to both types of 
barriers negative or ·uncomfortable" emotions ·occur" in the 
subject who experiences the barrter (cf. Campos, et al., 1983). 
Despite this similarity, however, the basic emotions differ in 
each action type because of the different psychological quality 
each displays. We try to convey thls difference by using quite 
different terms for the same type of emotion. In effect-oriented 
actions barrier (problem)-related emotions are named ·rage." 
However, in communication oriented actions barrier(conflict)-
related emotions are named "anger." Similarly, like Campos, et 
al, (1983) and others, we also assume some ·positive feelings" 
if an act is successfully brought to a concIusion. Again, however, 
we propose to differentiate emotional ·colours" within these 
positive emotions depending on the type of action in which they 
are experienced. A successful communicative action (a process 
of mutual understanding), refers to some kind of emotional 
sharing. It is obvious that the attribution of the particular terms 
to the respective emotional conditions is a rather arbitraJ:y one. 
What is important, however, is that we try to distinguish subtypes 
of emotional states or modes, which are produced by the kind of 
action withln which they occur. 
"Clearly, equivalent processes can be assumed within communi-
cative actions. The goal here is to understand another person, and 
to co-ordinate interactions. Thetefore the emotional states of 
happiness, referred to above (see Footnote 2), represent self-
oriented feelings of a ·communicative success· equivalent to the 
"functional potentiality" that Boesch is talking about In the case 
of communicative actions one may also argue that these feelings 
become associated with specific communicative partners, even 
with situations or places etc. Some interpretations and data from 
research on the development of attachment and early fear-
reactions in children (cf. Bower, 1979) are at least compatible 
with thls notion. Obviously, however, much more research is 
needed before these concepts can, be fully accepted within an 
action theory. But as yet they are cIearly stimulating guidelines. 
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